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The Statutory Death of the Gig Economy: 
How California Policy Incentivizes the 
Automation of Five Million Jobs 
HENRY MORENO* 
With the advent of the gig economy, many have benefited 
from the availability of flexible work, particularly in the 
service industry. Since then, whether these workers are 
independent contractors or employees—entitled to certain 
rights and benefits—has been intensely debated. This Note 
examines the different legal approaches used in worker 
classification and the ramifications an employee designation 
could have on the estimated five million jobs the gig 
economy currently supports. Accordingly, this Note 
advocates the current state of the law is inept as applied to 
the gig economy and examines a potential framework to 
align the benefits of the gig economy while protecting 
against employee misclassification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Just four years after the inception of Uber in 2009,1 giving rise 
to what is now known as Transportation Network Companies 
(“TNCs”), the fight over driver classification has ensued.2 TNCs op-
erate under a business model that has been coined the “gig econ-
omy.”3 Since then, TNCs have continued to vigorously fight to 
 
 1 Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 13 (Apr. 11, 2019). 
 2 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(finding Uber’s arbitration agreement with its drivers enforceable, preventing 
drivers from certifying as a class in their 2013 alleged state and federal violation 
claims resulting from misclassification as independent contractors rather than em-
ployees). 
 3 See John Frazer, How the Gig Economy Is Reshaping Careers for the Next 
Generation, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2019, 9:40 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/02/15/how-the-gig-economy-is-reshaping-careers-
for-the-next-generation/#3afe253349ad. The “gig economy” describes the 
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classify drivers as independent contractors while many drivers ad-
vocate for employee designation.4 Independent contractors are gen-
erally individuals that offer their services for hire but are free from 
the control of the hiring party in the manner in which they perform 
their work.5 The issue has surfaced internationally and carries huge 
financial implications for TNCs in the form of mandated employee 
benefits abroad and in the United States.6 Several states have statu-
torily recognized TNC drivers as independent contractors under 
their motor vehicle statutes.7 Today, all states have some form of 
motor vehicle TNC regulation on their books, with the exception of 
Oregon, which expressly designates drivers as independent contrac-
tors, implies an independent contractor relationship, or is silent on 
the issue altogether and simply addresses insurance requirements.8 
 
independent business model employed by corporations like Uber, Lyft, and Door 
Dash. Id. These business models depend on attracting willing workers to engage 
in the service they respectively provide by offering flexibility in scheduling, over-
sight, and a relatively low level of prerequisite skill. See id. This business model 
has allowed many workers to leave otherwise necessary jobs by providing an al-
ternative means of income while these workers pursue other desired career paths. 
See id. 
 4 See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Settles Driver Classification Lawsuit for $20 
Million, VERGE (Mar. 12, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2019/3/12/18261755/uber-driver-classification-lawsuit-settlement-20-
million; Peter Blumberg & Erin Mulvaney, Uber’s Arch Nemesis on Driver Pay 
Sues Before New Law Even Inked, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-13/uber-s-arch-nemesis-on-
driver-pay-sues-before-new-law-even-inked. 
 5 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DEFINED, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-
contractor-defined (last updated Dec. 3, 2020). 
 6 See Jacob Passy, Uber Doesn’t Want Its Drivers to Be Employees—Here’s 
Why That Matters, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://www.mar-
ketwatch.com/story/uber-doesnt-want-its-drivers-to-be-employees-heres-why-
that-matters-2017-11-13; see also Sam Schechner, Uber Drivers Entitled to 
Workers Rights Including Minimum Wage, U.K. Supreme Court Rules, WALL ST. 
J (Feb. 19, 2021, 5:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-faces-setback-as-
u-k-court-rules-drivers-are-entitled-to-worker-rights-
11613729882?st=flktym4x6fnh7vn&reflink=article_email_share. 
 7 See Eduardo Munoz, Three US States Have Already Blessed Uber’s Inde-
pendent Contractor Employment Model, QUARTZ (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://qz.com/571249/three-us-states-have-already-blessed-ubers-independent-
contractor-employment-model/. 
 8 See infra Part II.D.2. 
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The National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) has also pro-
vided input on the issue, determining drivers to be independent con-
tractors by applying a version of the common-law agency test.9 
One of the most significant threats to Uber’s independent con-
tractor business model came in September of 2019 when the Cali-
fornia legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 5 (“AB 5”), which cod-
ified the California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex Opera-
tions W. v. Superior Court.10 The effect of AB 5 is to place the bur-
den on employers to demonstrate that their workers are not employ-
ees under the “ABC” test.11 As of November 2020, TNCs prevailed 
on Proposition 22, a California ballot measure exempting them from 
AB 5.12 Prior to AB 5’s passage, however, TNCs came to the table 
with a rejected $21 per hour offer as long as they could maintain an 
independent contractor relationship.13 
 
 9 Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Couns. Div. of 
Advice, Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., to Jill Coffman, Reg’l Dir. Region 20, Nat’l Lab. 
Rels. Bd. (Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter NLRB Advice Memorandum], 
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-163062. 
 10 See generally Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019); Dynamex Op-
erations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35–42 (Cal. 2018). In Dynamex, the 
California Supreme Court applied a three-part “ABC” test and determined a de-
livery company’s drivers could be legally classified as employees for the com-
monality inquiry under class certification. Id. The three-part test consisted of: (A) 
whether the worker was free from control and direction of the hiring entity in the 
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work 
and in fact; (B) whether the worker performs work outside the usual course of the 
hiring entity’s business; and (C) whether the worker is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the 
work performed for the hiring entity. Id. 
 11 See Carolyn Said, AB5 Gig Work Bill: All Your Questions Answered, S.F. 
CHRON. (Feb. 26, 2020, 3:10 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/arti-
cle/AB5-gig-work-bill-All-your-questions-answered-14441764.php. 
 12 See LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., PROPOSITION 22 EXEMPTS APP-BASED 
TRANSPORTATION FROM PROVIDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TO CERTAIN DRIVERS, 
at 1 (2020), https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=22&year
=2020. 
 13 Preetika Rana, California Voters Exempt Uber, Lyft, DoorDash from Re-
classifying Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2020, 7:29 AM) [hereinafter Rana, Re-
classifying Drivers], https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-voters-exempt-
uber-lyft-doordash-from-having-to-reclassify-drivers-11604476276?st=
uvuof3hifxf5pak&reflink=article_email_share; Cyrus Farivar, ‘Gaming the Sys-
tem’ – Uber and Lyft Face a Driver Reckoning in California, NBC NEWS (June 
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The $21 per hour offer comes as no surprise as the cost of clas-
sifying drivers as employees in California alone is estimated to be 
$500 million per year for Uber and $290 million per year for Lyft.14 
Lyft, already operating at nearly a $1 billion net loss in 2018,15 has 
acknowledged the extreme financial burden it would endure based 
on an employee designation, and many have suggested Lyft will 
likely not see a profit for years to come.16 Lyft has also raised the 
fact that many part-time drivers would no longer benefit from extra 
income simply because Lyft would be forced to create driving 
schedules under an employee model that would likely conflict with 
other full-time employment.17 Although Proposition 22 shields 
TNCs in California for the time being, a look at AB 5’s effect on the 
gig economy nationwide is warranted, especially as the economy 
recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part I of this Note will begin with a look at the limited empirical 
data available that places into perspective driver demographics, 
complaints, pay, and expenses. In Part II, this Note will discuss the 
TNC driver relationship as analyzed under the common-law agency 
test, the Dynamex “ABC” test, and the “entrepreneurial opportunity” 
approach utilized by the NLRB in determining employment rela-
tionships. It will also provide an overview of legislation passed in 
each state on TNC liability. In Part III, this Note turns to an over-
view of some state and federally mandated employee benefits and 
 
2, 2019, 5:35 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/gaming-system-
uber-lyft-face-driver-reckoning-california-n1012376; see also Alexandria Sage, 
California Senate Passes Bill to Tighten ‘Gig’ Worker Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 
2019, 2:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-employment-california/cali-
fornia-senate-passes-bill-to-tighten-gig-worker-rule-idUSKCN1VW0M7. 
 14 Marco della Cava, Uber Drivers and Other Gig Workers in California 
Could See Improved Lifestyle Under Proposed Law, USA TODAY (July 18, 2019, 
8:16 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/17/lyft-uber-
drivers-center-california-employment-bill/1715578001/. 
 15 Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 73 (Mar. 1, 2019). 
 16 Johana Bhuiyan, If Lyft Can’t Keep its Drivers as Independent Contrac-
tors, It May Never Be Profitable, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-ipo-drivers-
20190309-story.html. 
 17 Alejandro Lazo & Eliot Brown, Uber, Lyft Poised to Lose Fight Against 
California Bill to Label Drivers Employees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2019, 8:42 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-poised-to-lose-fight-against-california-
bill-to-label-drivers-employees-11568069041. 
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the associated costs of such benefits. TNC costs for these benefits 
are illustrated through a look at the Ford Motor Company and esti-
mates by the Department of Labor. 
Part IV of this Note explores the response TNCs will take from 
a proactive stance in order to minimize the financial exposure of 
employee benefits by aiming to eliminate the need for drivers—
most significantly, the research and development of autonomous ve-
hicle capability. Part IV will also glance at how the COVID-19 pan-
demic has exacerbated the tensions between TNCs, drivers, and 
State Legislators. This Note concludes that the current state of 
agency law is inapt for gig economy18 application and should incor-
porate, what the author has termed, the “pragmatic effect” approach 
to driver classification. This approach will enable true gig economy 
corporations to operate and provide workers the capability to earn 
supplemental income and minimize incentives to reduce costs, or 
ultimately, the workforce itself, through automation. The “prag-
matic effect” principle looks at (1) whether the industry necessarily 
depends on an independent contractor status at its finding and (2) 
whether an employee designation would essentially destroy the in-
dustry and disincentivize future endeavors in the gig economy. 
Without a look towards the practical consequences of designat-
ing TNC drivers as employees, the ridesharing business model is 
certain to disappear along with the five million jobs it has created.19 
As later discussed in further detail, if all TNC drivers were desig-
nated as employees, Uber and Lyft would incur a $23 billion and $6 
billion employee expense, respectively.20 This expense would rep-
resent more than double Uber’s 2018 $11 billion revenue and almost 
three times Lyft’s 2018 $2.2 billion revenue.21 
I. SUMMARY OF THE LYFT & UBER DRIVER 2019 SURVEY 
A significant obstacle in the TNC driver debate is the lack of 
empirical data available. A look at the limited available data seems 
 
 18 See Frazer, supra note 3. 
 19 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5 (reporting 3.9 million Drivers on 
the Uber platform as of December 2018); Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2 (reporting 
1.1 million Drivers on the Lyft platform as of December 2018). 
 20 See infra Part III.B. 
 21 See id. 
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to undermine the frequent argument that more TNC drivers are turn-
ing to ridesharing as full-time employment and should be treated 
like traditional employees.22 Uber and Lyft have a combined five 
million drivers on their network as reported in their S-1 filings.23 
The latest internal study conducted by Uber on driver demographics 
was released in 2015.24 The Uber study was limited in sample size 
and only consisted of 833 driver interviews.25 Uber reports that 50% 
of its drivers drive less than ten hours per week.26 While the Uber 
report did not capture driver age, an independent 2016 survey re-
ported that 26% of Uber’s drivers were over fifty-years-old.27 Sim-
ilarly, Lyft, with much more recent data, reported that 23% of its 
drivers are over the age of fifty.28 Lyft reports that 90% of its drivers 
work less than twenty hours per week.29 The Lyft study relied on 
responses from 166,540 drivers.30 
Between August and September 2019, nearly 70,000 e-mail sur-
veys were sent out to subscribers of The Rideshare Guy.31 The e-
mail surveys generated 948 responses and the following results are 
based on 947 of these responses.32 Of those taking the survey, 911 
answered that the most important thing to them as a driver was pay 
 
 22 See della Cava, supra note 14. 
 23 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2. 
 24 New Survey: Drivers Choose Uber for its Flexibility and Convenience, 
UBER (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/driver-partner-survey/. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Mike Sonders, These Latest Uber Statistics Show How It’s Dominating 
Lyft, SURVEYMONKEY INTEL. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://medium.com/@sm_app_in-
tel/these-latest-uber-statistics-show-how-its-dominating-lyft-53f6b255de5e. 
 28 2020 Economic Impact Report: Drivers, LYFT, https://www.lyftim-
pact.com/stats/national [https://web.archive.org/web/20200604103203/https://
www.lyftimpact.com/stats/national] (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 29 Id. 
 30 LYFT POL’Y RSCH, ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, 2020 METHODOLOGICAL 
SUPPLEMENT 3 (2020). 
 31 See HARRY CAMPBELL, THE RIDESHARE GUY 2019 READER SURVEY 1, 3 
(2019). The Rideshare Guy consists of a blog, YouTube channel and podcast uti-
lized by the rideshare community since 2013 and is self-described as one of the 
largest third-party independent sources of rideshare information. See RIDESHARE 
GUY, https://therideshareguy.com/ (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 32 CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 3, 13. One response was determined to be a 
duplicate and not every response answered each survey question. Id at 13. 
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(52.9%), followed by flexibility (36.7%).33 The remaining 10.4% of 
responses consisted of safety, company culture, and pay, followed 
by employee benefits.34 Approximately 55.2% of drivers considered 
themselves part-time, while a surprising 72.4% of drivers reported 
their age to be between 51 and 71 years old.35 An additional 16.7% 
reported they fell within the 41 to 50 age group.36 Only 10.9% re-
ported they fell within the 18 to 40 age group.37 
From 911 responses, drivers indicated that 19.8% have only 
signed up for one ride-sharing service, while 76.6% have signed up 
for two or more.38 50.8% of drivers reported primarily driving for 
Uber, followed by 19.9% for Lyft and another 22.9% indicated they 
drive for Uber and Lyft equally.39 
Only 463 responses were received for questions about pay with 
Uber.40 36.1% of Uber drivers reported earning between $20 and 
$29.99 per hour, before expenses.41 21% of Uber drivers reported 
earning $10 to $14.99 per hour while another 26.1% reported $15 to 
$19.99 per hour.42 Uber drivers reported an hourly cost of $6.26 per 
hour due to vehicle expenses.43 On average and after expenses, Uber 
drivers reported pay of $13.47 per hour,44 while Lyft drivers re-
ported $11.55 per hour.45 Interestingly, a 2020 survey revealed that 
even during the middle of the pandemic, a majority of drivers (71%) 
reported they wanted to remain independent contractors.46 
 
 33 Id. at 4. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 4, 11. 
 36 Id. at 11. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 8. 
 39 Id. at 7. 
 40 Id. at 5. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. From 181 responses, 25.4% of Lyft drivers reported they earned $20 to 
$29.99 per hour and 28.7% reported they earned $10 to $14.99 per hour before 
expenses. Id. at 6. 
 43 Id. at 5. 
 44 Id. This represents a 17% pay increase from the results of the 2018 survey 
conducted. See id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Harry Campbell, Everything You Should Know About AB5 & Its Impact on 
Uber, RIDESHARE GUY (Oct. 7, 2020), https://therideshareguy.com/ab5-end-of-
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The results indicate that a majority of survey respondents are at 
or near retirement age (according to the The Ride Share Guy survey) 
or are university age (according to the Uber and Lyft disclosures) 
and driving part-time. A primary concern for drivers is pay, fol-
lowed by flexibility in the work schedule which makes sense in the 
context of both the retiree and college student. Additionally, em-
ployee benefits are of low concern, at least to the surveyed group. 
This also makes sense for the retired group as they are likely draw-
ing benefits from other sources like traditional employment avenues 
and for the college-aged group which may still be receiving health 
benefits through their parents or school. The reported after-expenses 
pay further suggests that a majority of drivers are seeking supple-
mentary rather than primary income from their driving activity. 
If similar results were observed in a more comprehensive and 
statistically significant survey, the results would strongly undercut 
the argument that ridesharing is a primary source of income for most 
drivers. Many may assume that a majority of drivers are at the 
younger end of the workforce or rely on ridesharing as a primary 
means of income. Even though this may be the case in some in-
stances, it does not appear to represent a majority of rideshare driv-
ers who responded to the survey. The gig economy in this context 
appears to primarily enable retirees and college students to supple-
ment their income without a need for additional employee benefits. 
The threat of losing work flexibility and supplemental income in ex-
change for traditional employee benefits may explain why a major-
ity of drivers wish to remain independent contractors, even during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.47 With this limited data in mind, this Note 
now turns to a discussion of the law as it relates to the various ap-
proaches found within the employee versus independent contractor 
debate. 
II. THE COMPETING RELATIONSHIP TESTS 
Determining whether an independent contractor or employee re-
lationship exists differs not just amongst the several states but also 
 
rideshare/. The survey results were based on 734 responses and revealed a pre-
pandemic-survey of the same question. Id. The pre-pandemic-survey revealed 
81% of respondents favored independent contractor status. Id. 
 47 See id. 
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amongst several agencies involved in employee benefits.48 Even 
though some elements of the tests are in common agreement, a much 
more significant similarity is that the analysis requires a fact-inten-
sive inquiry.49 Courts and commentators have acknowledged that 
this fact-intensive inquiry leads to opposite conclusions on similar 
fact patterns.50 
At the outset, it is important to highlight a legal distinction 
adopted by some jurisdictions, including California, when determin-
ing a worker’s status.51 When the classification is pertinent to the 
issue of liability, the common-law agency test, as articulated by the 
Second Restatement of Agency in section 220 (“Restatement 
 
 48 See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #13: 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FSLA) 
(2008) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. FACT SHEET], 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.htm (expressly stating the 
employer-employee relationship is not “determined by the common law standards 
relating to master and servant”); Easton Saltsman, Comment, A Free Market Ap-
proach to the Rideshare Industry and Worker Classification: The Consequences 
of Employee Status and a Proposed Alternative, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 209, 211–
12 (2017). 
 49 See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (noting 
facts of relationship were necessary to establish in applying common-law agency 
test); Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 7–9 (Cal. 2018) 
(noting specifically what attire drivers were required to wear, what cellular phone 
drivers were required to obtain to perform on-demand work, and other delivery 
restrictions); Cantor v. Cochran¸184 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1966) (noting that an 
employer-employee relationship does not merely rest on the contractual agree-
ment but rather “upon all the circumstances of their dealings with each other”). 
 50 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 14 (“Few problems in the law have given greater 
variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the border-
land between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is 
clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.” (citing NLRB v. Hearst 
Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1994))); Richard B. Keeton, An Uber Dilemma: 
The Conflict Between the Seattle Rideshare Ordinance, the NLRA, and For-Hire 
Driver Worker Classification, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 216 (2017); Benjamin Pow-
ell, Identity Crisis: The Misclassification of California Uber Drivers, 50 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 459, 468–69 (2017); Mark Macmurdo, Comment, Hold the Phone! 
“Peer-To-Peer” Ridesharing Services, Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 
307, 328 (2015). 
 51 See infra Part II.A. 
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§220”), is generally utilized by courts.52 On the other hand, when 
the classification bears on the question of whether a worker is enti-
tled to some sort of benefit grounded in a statutory right, a much 
more liberal framework applies in some jurisdictions.53 
This Part will examine the competing analyses among two states 
and one federal agency, followed by a look at how these entities 
have specifically resolved or addressed the issue as to TNCs and 
their drivers. In doing so, this Part will first discuss California’s ap-
proach, then Florida’s, and end with an examination of the NLRB’s 
analysis on TNC driver employment status. This analysis is not done 
with an eye towards determining which classification is correct or 
should be utilized. Rather, it is to demonstrate that these classifica-
tions depend not just on the common-law agency test but, more im-
portantly, on distinct jurisdictional guiding principles which have 
not aptly developed to handle the gig economy. 
A. The California Approach and Liberal Public Policy Model 
 In its most recent significant decision pertaining to inde-
pendent contractor and employee designation—and giving rise to 
AB 5—the California Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy discus-
sion of the history and purpose of its “suffer or permit to work 
 
 52 Florida has also applied the Restatement §220 to determine that a whole-
sale grocery store’s merchandise loader, who only received tips as compensation 
from customers, was an independent contractor rather than an employee for pur-
poses of Workers’ Compensation. See Cantor, 184 So. 2d at 174–75. The factors 
under the Restatement §220 include: (i) extent of control, by the agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work; (ii) whether or not the one em-
ployed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (iii) whether the work is 
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(iv) the required skill; (v) the supplier of tools or instrumentalities utilized; (vi) 
the length of the employment; (vii) the method of payment; (viii) whether the 
work is part of the regular business of the employer; (ix) whether the belief of a 
master-servant relationship exists; and (x) whether the principal is or is not in 
business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958); Can-
tor, 184 So. 2d at 174–75; see also Miami-Dade Cty v. State Dep’t of Labor and 
Emp’t Sec., 749 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the applicabil-
ity of Cantor and the Restatement §220 but reversing employment designation by 
the Unemployment Board on grounds that county poll workers were “public of-
ficers” and therefore statutorily exempt). 
 53 See infra Part II.A. 
956 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:945 
 
standard,” before tempering the standard with the “ABC” test.54 The 
Dynamex court was faced with determining whether sufficient com-
monality in interest existed to justify class certification of drivers 
who alleged that Dynamex mischaracterized them as independent 
contractors and denied them employee benefits under California’s 
Labor Code.55 The relevant provisions of the Labor Code defined 
“employ” to mean “to engage, suffer, or permit to work”; “em-
ployee” to mean “any person employed by an employer”; and “em-
ployer” to mean any entity that “directly or indirectly, or through an 
agent or any other person, employs or exercises control over the 
wages, hours, or working conditions of any person.”56 
Dynamex previously classified its drivers as employees until a 
2004 policy change reclassified the drivers as independent contrac-
tors.57 Subsequently, Dynamex entered into contracts with its driv-
ers declaring them as such.58 The drivers continued to perform the 
same duties as they did prior to the 2004 policy change, making ful-
fillment deliveries between private customers and large businesses 
like Office Depot and Home Depot.59 Drivers were paid by either a 
flat fee or a percentage of the delivery fee and could set their own 
schedules but would have to notify Dynamex of when they planned 
to work.60 Drivers made deliveries using their own vehicles, were 
required to wear Dynamex shirts, and utilized Dynamex equipment 
purchased with their own funds.61 
The Dynamex court had to determine which test would apply to 
the employment classification under either the Borello or Martinez 
framework.62 Dynamex urged the court to apply the Borello frame-
work while contending that Martinez was inapplicable.63 Both of 
these standards will be discussed in turn. 
 
 54 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35. 
 55 Id. at 5. 
 56 Id. at 13 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090, subdiv. 2(D)–(F)). 
 57 Id. at 6. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. at 8. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 25 (first citing Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010); and 
then citing S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 
1989)). 
 63 Id. at 25–26. 
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Recognizing its previous precedent applying the Restatement 
§220 in the context of social welfare benefits,64 the Dynamex court 
presented justifications for departing from those Restatement §220 
factors as articulated in its decision in S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. 
Department of Industrial Relations: 
[F]ederal courts have long recognized that the dis-
tinction between tort policy and social-legislation 
policy justifies departures from common law princi-
ples when claims arise that one is excluded as an in-
dependent contractor from a statute protecting “em-
ployees” and that “a number of state courts have 
agreed that in worker’s compensation cases, the em-
ployee-independent contractor issue cannot be de-
cided absent consideration of the remedial statutory 
purpose.”65 
The “remedial statutory purpose” analysis was further supple-
mented by six factors the Borello court adopted from other jurisdic-
tions—which closely resemble the Restatement §220 factors66—ap-
plying a similar framework in deciding employment classification 
in the context of statutory benefits.67 
The Borello court noted that the workers’ compensation statute 
at issue served the purposes of (1) ensuring industrial injuries would 
be part of the cost of goods rather than a societal burden, (2) guar-
anteeing limited compensation to injured employees, (3) incentiviz-
ing increased safety standards, and (4) insulating employers from 
 
 64 Id. at 14–15 (first citing Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 471 P.2d, 
975, 979 (Cal. 1970); and then citing Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. 
Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686, 692 (Cal. 1946)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958). 
 65 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 16 (citation omitted) (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 
405). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958). 
 67 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 18 n.12. These factors include: (i) the right to 
control the worker; (ii) the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss based on 
managerial skill; (iii) the employee’s investment in equipment to complete the 
task; (iv) the requisite level of skill; (v) the permanency of the working relation-
ship; and (vi) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s 
business model. Id. 
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tort liability. 68 The Borello court ultimately held that supplemented 
with the “remedial statutory purpose” and examined against the 
common-law agency test, the functional nature of the relationship 
between the farmer and the agricultural laborers were that of em-
ployer-employee.69 
Interestingly enough, the Dynamex court noted that federal 
courts have declined to apply the “remedial statutory purpose” anal-
ysis to federal statutes and have instead required adherence to the 
traditional common law test absent a specific “statutory standard or 
definition of employment.”70 The court nevertheless pointed to the 
lack of interference by the California Legislature as approval of the 
“remedial statutory purpose” principle—an approval that later man-
ifested itself into AB 5.71 
Although the Borello framework, which encompassed a “reme-
dial statutory purpose” principle, may have seemed unfavorable to 
Dynamex, the Martinez framework would likely have been a much 
harsher obstacle for Dynamex to overcome. The Dynamex court ad-
dressed its decision, Martinez v. Combs, where it found a similar 
wage order defined “employ” and “employer” broadly.72 
The Martinez court examined a wage order from the Industrial 
Welfare Commission, which described employers as “those entities 
who ‘employ or suffer or permit’ persons to work for them.’” 73 The 
“suffer or permit” standard was “derived from statutes regulating 
and prohibiting child labor that were in use . . . in 1916.”74 The Mar-
tinez court explained that an entity that “knows that persons are 
working in his or her business without having been formally hired, 
or while being paid less than the minimum wage, clearly suffers or 
permits that work by failing to prevent it.”75 Further, the wage order 
defined “employer” to include a person or entity that “employs or 
exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of 
 
 68 Borello, 769 P.2d at 406. 
 69 See id. at 410. 
 70 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 20. 
 71 See id. Accordingly, as this Note later discusses, AB 5 recognizes Borello 
as the appropriate test for classification when the “ABC” test is not applicable or 
where such occupations are expressly exempt from its reach. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 72 Id. at 20 (citing Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010)). 
 73 Id. at 21 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 273). 
 74 Id. (citing Martinez, 231 P.3d at 273). 
 75 Id. at 23 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 281). 
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any person.”76 Ultimately, the Martinez court found that “employ,” 
under the wage order, had three alternative definitions: (1) to exer-
cise control over the wages, hours or working conditions (per the 
plain language of the wage order); (2) to “suffer or permit to work,” 
as construed in its use in child labor laws; or (3) to “engage” in work 
as understood in the common-law agency context.77 
Dynamex claimed that strict application of Martinez’s “suffer or 
permit” standard would practically render all workers directly hired 
to provide services as employees because businesses can “always be 
said to knowingly ‘suffer or permit’ such an individual to work for 
the business.”78 Accordingly, Dynamex argued, Martinez was inad-
equate to distinguish employees from true independent contractors 
such as plumbers.79 
The Dynamex court agreed, and after noting how far-reaching 
the “suffer or permit to work” standard would apply, the court tem-
pered the standard by adopting the “ABC” test employed by other 
jurisdictions.80 The court explained that the “suffer or permit to 
work” standard imposed a rebuttable presumption of an employer-
employee relationship unless the hiring party could establish the 
worker as an independent contractor.81 In order to overcome this 
presumption, the hiring party would have to establish each element 
in the three-factor “ABC” test which consists of (A) establishing the 
worker was free from the hiring party’s control, both by contract and 
in fact; (B) establishing the worker performs work “outside the usual 
course” of the hiring party’s business; and (C) establishing the 
worker is independently engaged in the same type of work provided 
to the hiring party.82 
The Dynamex court then found that sufficient commonality of 
interest existed for class certification under prongs B and C of the 
“ABC” test.83 The court found that determining whether the certified 
class of drivers performed a service outside the usual course of 
 
 76 Id. at 21 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 283). 
 77 Id. at 22–23 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 278). 
 78 Id. at 29. 
 79 Id. at 29–30. 
 80 See id. at 30, 34. 
 81 Id. at 34. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See id. at 41–42. 
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Dynamex’s business was easily resolvable on a class basis.84 Be-
cause the “ABC” test requires a hiring party to establish each prong, 
the court noted class certification was sufficient on prong B’s find-
ing alone; however, the court also found sufficient commonality of 
interest in whether the driver class independently engaged in the ser-
vices provided to Dynamex as part of their own distinct business or 
trade.85 
1.  DYNAMEX DISCUSSION 
In reaching its conclusion of class certification, the Dynamex 
court noted some particular facts that are useful in considering 
whether the “ABC” test—and subsequently AB 5—should be ap-
plied to TNCs operating under the gig economy. The most signifi-
cant fact, which the court addressed within the second paragraph of 
the opinion, was that Dynamex’s procedure of classifying its drivers 
as independent contractors rather than employees was a new busi-
ness practice:86 
Although in some circumstances classification as an 
independent contractor may be advantageous to 
workers as well as to businesses, the risk that work-
ers who should be treated as employees may be im-
properly misclassified as independent contractors is 
significant in light of the potentially substantial eco-
nomic incentives that a business may have in mis-
characterizing some workers as independent contrac-
tors . . . .In recent years, the relevant regulatory 
agencies of both the federal and state governments 
have declared that misclassification of workers as in-
dependent contractors rather than employees is a 
very serious problem, depriving federal and state 
governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue and 
millions of workers of the labor law protections to 
which they are entitled.87 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 42. 
 86 See id. The court first mentions this fact two paragraphs after delineating 
the persistent issue of worker misclassification. Id. 
 87 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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Indeed, the court made clear that economic incentive is what drove 
Dynamex to undergo reclassification of its drivers as independent 
contractors: “In 2004, Dynamex converted all of its drivers to inde-
pendent contractors after management concluded such a conversion 
would generate economic savings for the company.”88 
Another distinguishing fact noted in the opinion was Dynamex’s 
business model. The court characterized Dynamex as a 
nationwide same-day courier and delivery service 
that operates a number of business centers . . . offers 
on-demand, same-day pickup and delivery services 
to the public . . . and . . . has a number of large busi-
ness customers—including Office Depot and Home 
Depot—for whom it delivers purchased goods and 
picks up returns on a regular basis.89  
Because the drivers were an essential part of Dynamex’s delivery 
service business model, the company had little room to argue the 
drivers were independent contractors. 
Dynamex’s relationship and obligatory procedures for its drivers 
were also significant. Drivers that elected to be assigned as part of 
the dedicated fleet were required to notify Dynamex on which days 
they intended to work even though they could set their own sched-
ules.90 Drivers that performed on-demand work were “required to 
obtain a Nextel cellular telephone”—at no cost to Dynamex—to re-
ceive delivery orders.91 Drivers were liable for any loss incurred due 
to failed timely deliveries, were expected to wear Dynamex shirts, 
and were required to place Dynamex decals on their vehicles.92 Dy-
namex drivers were not prohibited from making deliveries for other 
competitors but could not prioritize a competitor’s delivery over that 
of Dynamex.93 
In finding for the plaintiff’s class certification, the Dynamex 
court resolved commonality in prongs B and C of the “ABC” test 
because the plaintiff-drivers exclusively delivered for Dynamex and 
 
 88 Id. at 8. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. 
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avoided the fact-intensive inquiry of the control element in prong 
A.94 
Even though there are several similarities between Dynamex and 
Uber/Lyft, the rideshare corporations still maintain that under Dy-
namex and AB 5, their drivers are independent contractors.95 In con-
trast to the specific cost-savings justification employed by Dy-
namex, TNCs can argue that their businesses have been wholly de-
pendent on an independent contractor model since inception.96 Fur-
ther, TNCs continue to maintain that, first and foremost, they are 
technology companies that simply match drivers to riders,97 unlike 
Dynamex who contracted with other corporations to fulfill delivery 
needs.98 
Most significantly, however, is that the Dynamex court only 
tempered the “suffer or permit” standard after accepting Dynamex’s 
argument that strict application would render all workers employ-
ees.99 The adoption of the “ABC” test by the California Supreme 
Court was essentially a response to the “pragmatic effect” that the 
Martinez standard would have accomplished. Similarly, the “prag-
matic effect” prism advocated in this Note would take into account 
the foundational business model of TNCs (or the gig economy at 
large) and its lasting effect. The Dynamex decision illustrates that 
courts are willing to consider and alter legal standards based on the 
“pragmatic effect” principle. This Note advocates courts should do 
so when dealing with TNC driver classification as current law is in-
ept to handle these gig economy issues. This Note will now turn to 
the text of AB 5 to determine whether the California Legislature has 
foreclosed these arguments and further discusses the basis for 
Uber/Lyft’s independent contractor theory. 
 
 94 See id. at 41–42. 
 95 See Said, supra note 11. 
 96 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 28. 
 97 See Janet Burns, Uber and Lyft Won’t Admit What They Are, FORBES (Mar. 
20, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/03/20/uber-
and-lyft-dont-know-what-they-are-courts-have-some-ideas/#46d5900cc13f. 
 98 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 8. 
 99 See id. at 30, 34. 
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2.  AB 5 DISCUSSION 
The codification of Dynamex in AB 5 emphasizes the need to 
properly classify employees in order to place payment obligations 
on employers.100 These payment obligations include contributions 
to unemployment insurance, disability insurance, workers’ compen-
sation premiums, minimum wage requirements, paid sick and fam-
ily leave, and payroll taxes.101 Further, AB 5 designates worker mis-
classification as a “significant factor in the erosion of the middle 
class and the rise in income inequality.”102 AB 5 makes clear that 
there is a presumption of an employer-employee relationship: 
SEC. 2. Section 2750.3 is added to the Labor Code, to read: 
2750.3. (a) (1) For purposes of the provisions of this 
code and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for 
the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commis-
sion, a person providing labor or services for remu-
neration shall be considered an employee rather than 
an independent contractor unless the hiring entity 
demonstrates that all of the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
(A) The person is free from the control and direc-
tion of the hiring entity in connection with the 
performance of the work, both under the contract 
for the performance of the work and in fact. 
(B) The person performs work that is outside the 
usual course of the hiring entity’s business. 
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an in-
dependently established trade, occupation, or 
business of the same nature as that involved in 
the work performed.103 
 
 100 See generally Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019). These employ-
ment obligations will be further discussed in Part III of this Note. 
 101 Id. § 1(b). 
 102 Id. § 1(c). 
 103 Id. § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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Interestingly, notwithstanding the assertion that significant ero-
sion of the middle class and the increase of income inequality is due 
to employee misclassification, the majority of AB 5’s text is spent 
outlining exceptions and fails to explicitly designate TNC drivers as 
employees.104 AB 5 leaves a court with explicit discretion to not ap-
ply Dynamex’s “ABC” test if the court determines that the test is 
inapplicable to a particular circumstance.105 Instead, the court is to 
apply the common-law agency test articulated in the Borello deci-
sion.106 AB 5 then goes on to expressly exclude various occupations 
from the “ABC” test and makes Borello the default agency test for 
most applications.107 
The enormous carve-out of exceptions raises significant ques-
tions that Uber and Lyft can exploit in their favor.108 First, is a court 
to apply the “ABC” test in like circumstances to Dynamex, where 
the court can determine the independent contractor classification 
was adopted by the corporation as a means to circumvent obligatory 
employer contributions, rather than a business model crafted on an 
independent contractor model from inception? Second, is Dy-
namex’s appeal to “remedial statutory purpose” still as equally ap-
plicable due to AB 5’s language? Or, alternatively, have the explicit 
exceptions swallowed “remedial statutory purpose” whole? Finally, 
is legislative history enough to effectuate what the majority of those 
in favor of employee-driver classification believe AB 5 to have ac-
complished?109 
 
 104 See generally id. § 2. 
 105 Id. §2(a)(3). 
 106 Id.; see supra note 67 (describing common-law agency test adopted in Bo-
rello). 
 107 Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2019). AB 5 expressly excludes the 
following from the “ABC” test and makes Borello the default: physicians, sur-
geons, dentists, podiatrists, psychologist, veterinarians, lawyers, architects, engi-
neers, private investigators, accountants, broker-dealers, investment advisers, di-
rect salespersons, commercial fishermen, contracts for “professional services” 
(including marketing, human resources, travel agents, graphic designers, fine art-
ists, photographers, and photojournalists), repossession agencies, and the con-
struction industry (subject to its own requirements/restrictions). Id. § 2(b)–(h). 
 108 See Said, supra note 11. 
 109 Although Proposition 22 cut short pending litigation over AB 5’s enforce-
ment in California, in August 2020, a state judge held that Uber and Lyft had to 
comply with AB 5. See Preetika Rana, Lyft, Uber Get More Time as They Fight 
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For all of the media attention and public support garnered by AB 
5, one would expect AB 5 to clearly designate Uber and Lyft drivers 
as employees rather than independent contractors. Nevertheless, AB 
5 provides courts ample room to make the “ABC” test inapplicable 
in the rideshare-driver context. Courts could reasonably conclude 
that Dynamex and AB 5 are applicable to only those situations where 
it seems the corporation is trying to circumvent state benefit pay-
ments. This is exactly the atmosphere Dynamex was decided on. As 
was discussed above, the Dynamex court made explicit mention of 
Dynamex’s relabeling of its drivers as independent contractors for 
the express purpose of saving cost to the company.110 
This, however, is not the case for Uber and Lyft. Both rideshar-
ing companies were founded on the idea that such a business venture 
would operate under an independent contractor theory and have 
warned potential investors of the consequences of such designation 
in their prospectuses.111 Uber warned investors that an employee 
designation would “require [Uber] to fundamentally change [its] 
business model, and consequently have an adverse effect on [its] 
business and financial condition.”112 This disclosure was made after 
Uber identified several adverse rulings in the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States, more specifically, the Dynamex deci-
sion.113 
Lyft similarly warned investors by stating: 
[A]ny legal proceeding that classifies a driver on a 
ridesharing platform as an employee may require us 
to significantly alter our existing business model and 
operations and impact our ability to add qualified 
drivers to our platform and grow our business, which 
 
California Order, THE WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 6:59 PM) [hereinafter Rana, 
Lyft, Uber Get More Time], https://www.wsj.com/articles/lyft-to-suspend-ser-
vice-in-california-11597942614?st=ja1iz41e4f7gxkr&reflink=arti-
cle_email_share. Subsequently, both Uber and Lyft warned that they would be 
limiting or discontinuing operations in California, which prompted an emergency 
stay by a state appeals court. Id. 
 110 See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 
2018). 
 111 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 28. 
 112 Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 28. 
 113 See id. 
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could have an adverse effect on our business, finan-
cial condition and results of operations.114 
Uber and Lyft are not postured in the same position as Dynamex 
because of the independent contractor model of TNCs from incep-
tion.115 Thus, a court can likely maneuver around the “ABC” test, if 
so inclined. Additionally, it is important to consider Dynamex’s ap-
plication of “remedial statutory purpose” as it applies to social ben-
efits and the contrary language of AB 5. As previously discussed, 
the “remedial statutory purpose” construction enabled courts to read 
in an expansionist view of employee protections under the workers’ 
compensation law at issue in Borello and in the wage statute at issue 
in Dynamex.116 A court, however, will have to do some work in es-
tablishing that AB 5’s purpose is to guarantee employee benefits to 
rideshare drivers amongst the backdrop of AB 5’s language. 
First, if the purpose of AB 5 is to curb the misuse of employee 
misclassification,117 why would the bill include such a large swath 
of exceptions that reach major industries operating in just this man-
ner? This question would likely have a court consider the factors at 
play in Dynamex that lead the court to adopt the presumptive em-
ployee classification and “ABC” test. The most significant factor for 
the applicability of the “ABC” test would be the highly suspicious 
motive of switching to an independent contractor status for the pur-
poses of cost-savings by circumventing employee benefits.118 
If the forces at play which rallied breath into AB 5 were, in fact, 
those of TNC driver concerns, why would the California legislature 
write AB 5 in such a manner that leaves wide uncertainty as to the 
TNC driver status? A much simpler solution would be to designate 
the TNC driver relationship as one clearly statutorily defined as 
 
 114 Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 29. 
 115 See Frazer, supra note 3. 
 116 See supra Part II.A. 
 117 Additionally, some courts have given little weight to purposivist arguments 
on the grounds that determining statutory purpose is a futile task given the inher-
ent give-and-take process of legislation. See, e.g., Van Hollen, Jr. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 811 F.3d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Statutes are hardly, if ever, sin-
gular in purpose. Rather, most laws seek to achieve a variety of ends in a way that 
reflects the give-and-take of the legislative process.”). 
 118 See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 
2018). 
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employer-employee instead of largely describing what AB 5 does 
not pertain to and relying on a statutory presumption. AB 5’s silence 
on the TNC driver relationship is yet another factor leaning in Uber 
and Lyft’s favor when arguing around the applicability of AB 5. 
Given the AB 5’s legislative history and advocacy from TNC driv-
ers in support,119 however, a court could also reconcile these ten-
sions in favor of TNC drivers when faced with the argument that the 
“ABC” test is inapplicable to Uber and Lyft. 
In summary, a court against the application of the “ABC” test, 
as articulated in Dynamex, can just as equally decline application of 
the test as a court inclined to apply it. Instead of giving TNC drivers 
and corporations a clear indication of where they stand on the rela-
tionship scale, AB 5 created another layer of uncertainty until Prop-
osition 22 settled the matter in California.120 Other jurisdictions, 
however, could attempt to adopt the “ABC” test. Unlike the “ABC” 
test, Borello does not begin with a presumption of employee desig-
nation, which TNCs will want to take advantage of, despite the “re-
medial statutory purpose” principle that Borello does apply.121 Bo-
rello further relies on several factors of the common-law agency test 
that TNCs have been successful in the past.122 AB 5 applies the tem-
pered Martinez standard through the narrow “ABC” test with the 
goal of finding an employee designation.123 The “ABC” test takes 
little account of the financial impact an employer-employee desig-
nation would have and even less thought on how such an impact 
would incentivize TNCs to invest and develop autonomous driving 
capability.124 Without the backdrop of the “pragmatic effect,” the 
“ABC” test would injure state revenue and workers as the gig econ-
omy could significantly shrink.125 
Many critics may characterize the “pragmatic effect” advocated 
for in this Note as nothing more than mere judicial activism. This 
Note, however, recognizes that the debate is long past judicial 
 
 119 See della Cava, supra note 14. 
 120 See Rana, Reclassifying Drivers, supra note 13. 
 121 See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 17 (citing S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. 
Rel, 769 P.2d 399, 406–07 (Cal. 1989)). 
 122 See id. at 18 n.12; Borello, 769 P.2d at 406–07. 
 123 See Assemb. B. 5, 2019–20 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019); Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 
35; see also Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 279 (Cal. 2010). 
 124 See generally Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35. 
 125 See infra Part III. 
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activism. The Dynamex decision is just one example of judicial ac-
tivism in American jurisprudence. When courts craft new legal 
standards based on societal implications—altering legal standards 
already in place—that later manifest in statutory adoption by the 
legislature, judicial activism is arguably at its peak. It may very well 
be that codification signals courts were right to consider societal im-
plications and as such, the criticism that the “pragmatic effect” 
prism advocated here is nothing but judicial activism, is unavailing. 
This Note will next discuss Florida’s approach to employment clas-
sification and how it differs from California. 
B.  The Florida Approach and Recognized Public Policy 
Model 
At the time of this writing, Florida has not adopted the “ABC” 
test articulated in Dynamex, but there are many points of agreement 
between California’s treatment of the employee classification test in 
Borello and that of Florida’s in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Kendall and its progeny.126 Borello and Kendall both pointed to the 
factors stated in the Restatement §220,127 and both found the issue 
of “control” significant.128 Even though Kendall was a negligence 
action, it set the stage for litigation over employee classification in 
 
 126 Mia. Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276, 276 (Fla. 1956). Kendall 
involved a negligence claim against the Miami Herald when a newspaper delivery 
person struck the appellee with a motorcycle while delivering newspapers. Id. The 
Court first looked to the contract provision between the newspaper delivery per-
son and the Miami Herald. Id. at 277. The Court determined the contract estab-
lished an independent contractor relationship and, though not dispositive, would 
require a showing otherwise to overcome the agreed upon relationship. Id. at 279. 
The Court further examined the practical nature of control on the delivery person 
by the Miami Herald and determined that—under the first Restatement §220 fac-
tors—the delivery person was an independent contractor. Id. at 279 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1933)). 
 127 Compare Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 279 with Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. Kendall 
cited the first Restatement of Agency Law § 220, while Borello cited the Restate-
ment §220. See Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 279; Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. Restatement 
§220, however, remained materially similar between the two versions, except for 
the addition of a factor in the second Restatement of Agency Law. See 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1933); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958). 
 128 Compare Kendall, 88 So. 2d at 277–79 with Borello, 769 P.2d at 400–01, 
403–404 (both providing detailed analysis of the control exerted by the principle 
over the servant). 
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the context of social benefits. In Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 
the Florida Supreme Court held that “the Kendall analysis of status 
applies regardless of whether the issue arises in the context of a tort 
claim or a workers’ compensation claim.”129 Keith involved a work-
ers’ compensation claim against the Sun Sentinel from one of its 
newspaper street vendors.130 The Sun Sentinel contracted with a de-
livery agent who in turn hired the street vendors.131 
Like the Borello court, Keith recognized the “remedial statutory 
purpose” of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act but fell short of 
the talismanic effect Borello impugned: “Although we do not find 
that this policy factor controls the outcome of this case, we agree it 
is a proper matter to consider, and may be potentially helpful in the 
resolution of a case otherwise too close to call.”132 
In applying the Kendall framework, the Keith Court affirmed the 
compensation judge’s analysis, which first looked to the agreement 
between the parties and determined the parties intended an inde-
pendent contractor relationship.133 The compensation judge then de-
termined whether the agreement itself or the actual practice of the 
parties mitigated the independent contractor status and functionally 
created sufficient control over one party, rendering them an em-
ployee.134 The Court found little factual evidence that the Sun Sen-
tinel controlled the means by which the newspaper street vendor was 
to conduct business and found no evidence of a direct relationship 
between the Sun Sentinel and Keith.135 On these facts, the Florida 
Supreme Court affirmed the compensation judge’s findings below 
that Keith was an independent contractor and ineligible for workers’ 
compensation benefits.136 
 
 129 Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995). 
 130 Id. at 168. 
 131 Id. The contract between the Sun Sentinel and the delivery agent declared 
an independent contractor relationship. Id. The delivery agent was responsible for 
its own tax liability and contributions. Id. The delivery agent also provided its 
street vendors with the option of accident insurance, which the delivery agent paid 
premiums for through the Sun Sentinel, which would, in turn, pay the insurance 
carrier. Id. 
 132 Id. at 171. 
 133 Id. at 171–72. 
 134 See id. at 172–73. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Id. at 173–74. 
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In fleshing out Florida’s approach to employee classification, 
the Eleventh Circuit discussed Kendall and Keith in a dispute arising 
between FedEx and its drivers over business expense reimbursement 
and overtime pay.137 The Eleventh Circuit looked at the agreement 
between FedEx and the drivers, which provided that the drivers were 
independent contractors and that the means by which the delivery 
tasks were completed were “within the discretion of the drivers.”138 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit examined other provisions of the 
agreement and the practical control that FedEx exercised over the 
drivers.139 Most significantly, the court recognized that the robust 
contract provisions, despite their characterization of the relation-
ship, evidenced considerable control over the drivers on behalf of 
FedEx.140 The agreement reserved to FedEx “control over the type, 
configuration, and appearance of the driver’s truck and the tools and 
instrumentalities used for package delivery, such as the FedEx scan-
ner and recordkeeping methods.”141 
The Court then analogized the issue before it to Del Pilar v. DHL 
Global Customer Solutions, Inc., which contained similar facts and 
in which it found that summary judgment was inappropriate due to 
the contractual provisions evincing control despite an independent 
contractor designation.142 Based on the highly fact-intensive nature 
of employee classification, the Eleventh Circuit found that sufficient 
facts existed supporting each party’s arguments and reversed the 
district court’s summary judgment in favor of FedEx on the inde-
pendent contractor designation.143 
C.  The Florida and California Discussion 
As these cases make clear, Florida primarily turns to an exami-
nation of the relationship as intended by written contract (“party-
 
 137 See Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1316, 
1320–22 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 138 Id. at 1319 (quoting In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 
2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010)). 
 139 See id. at 1325–26. 
 140 See id. 
 141 Id. at 1321. 
 142 See id. at 1323–24 (discussing Del Pilar v. DHL Glob. Customer Sols., 
Inc., 993 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 143 See id. at 1326–28. 
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intent”) and then looks to any indicia of a contrary status.144 As in 
Carlson, the robust contract provisions that nevertheless character-
ized the driver relationship as that of an independent contractor es-
tablished genuine issues as to whether FedEx exercised significant 
control over the drivers.145 Even though Keith recognized the public 
policy aspect of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act,146 the sub-
sequent case law demonstrates that Florida spends little time on such 
concerns and primarily relies on a “control” analysis and the factors 
outlined in the Restatement §220.147 
That said, this is in opposition to California’s Borello framework 
that seems to engage in “remedial statutory purpose” as a means to 
expand employee classification in social benefit instances.148 Fur-
ther, Dynamex and AB 5 are completely inconsistent with Florida’s 
Keith framework, as the former establishes a presumption of em-
ployee designation,149 while Keith first turns to the intended rela-
tionship of the parties, as evinced through their contract, and then 
examines the pragmatic relationship.150 
As discussed in Part II.A.2., Dynamex and AB 5 leave plenty of 
questions unanswered for both parties. If anything, Dynamex and 
AB 5 incentivize TNCs to automate away the substantial California 
workforce under their respective umbrellas. Under Keith, at the very 
least, a party can expect a court to begin with an examination of the 
written contract to determine relationship intent while still being 
cognizant that the actual relationship conditions will also be scruti-
nized.151 By its language, AB 5 presumes an employee relationship 
but, nevertheless, grants plenty of discretion to a reviewing court to 
make the “ABC” test inapplicable, a position Uber maintains.152 If 
certainty and proper employee classification for TNCs drivers was 
an aim of AB 5, it falls short on this front. This Note will next dis-
cuss the analysis employed by a federal agency, the NLRB, in reach-
ing employment classification decisions. 
 
 144 Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995). 
 145 See Carlson, 787 F.3d at 1328–29. 
 146 Id. at 171. 
 147 See supra note 52. 
 148 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 171 (Fla. 1995). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Said, supra note 11. 
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D.  The Federal Approach 
For purposes of examining the classification approach adopted 
by federal agencies in the context of employee rights and benefits, 
this Note takes a look at the approach adopted by the NLRB. The 
NLRB is charged with the administration of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (the “NLRA”).153 The NLRA enables employees, with 
or without a union, to take steps in improving their working condi-
tions, wages, and benefits with at least some protection against man-
agerial retaliation for such efforts.154 Of particular importance to this 
Note is the fact that the NLRA explicitly exempts workers that are 
deemed to be independent contractors from the NLRA’s protec-
tion.155 Accordingly, a threshold requirement for NLRA protection 
is a determination that the worker is an employee for purposes of the 
Act. 
The NLRB’s guidance on this vital threshold issue is illustrative 
of the distinct approach between federal and state governments. Of 
primary interest is NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel (the 
“OGC”) Advice Memorandum to Region 20 on the issue of whether 
TNC drivers are employees or independent contractors.156 The ad-
vice memorandum was written in response to two charges of unlaw-
ful termination and one charge of unlawful domination of a labor 
organization against Uber.157 Accordingly, whether these drivers 
were entitled to protection from the alleged conduct of Uber hinged 
on their status as either employees or independent contractors.158 
The OGC ultimately concluded that these drivers159 were 
 
 153 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. 
 154 Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/rights/employee-rights (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 155 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
 156 See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1. Region 20 of the 
NLRB services parts of California and the state of Hawaii. Region 20 - San Fran-
cisco, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/re-
gional-offices/region-20-san-francisco (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 157 See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
 158 See id. at 3. 
 159 The drivers were UberX and UberBLACK drivers. Id. at 14. The only sig-
nificant differences between the two types of drivers are that UberBLACK drivers 
invest more capital because they must provide higher-end vehicles, can contract 
with Uber as distinct business entities, and can hire others to drive their vehicles. 
Id. at 14–15. 
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independent contractors by similarly applying the Restatement §220 
factors160 previously discussed. Unlike Borello and Kendall, how-
ever, the OGC did not turn to “remedial statutory purpose” like Cal-
ifornia, nor did it begin its analysis on the intended relationship of 
the parties like Florida. Instead, the OGC applied the common law 
test “through ‘the prism of entrepreneurial opportunity’ set forth in 
SuperShuttle.”161 The entrepreneurial opportunity principle, as artic-
ulated by the D.C. Circuit, is “an important animating principle by 
which to evaluate [common law] factors in cases where some factors 
cut one way and some the other [and looks to] whether the position 
presents the opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurial-
ism.”162 
SuperShuttle involved a dispute between SuperShuttle Dallas-
Fort Worth (“SuperShuttle”) and its drivers under the NLRA.163 
Prior to 2005, these drivers were designated as employees by Su-
perShuttle.164 In 2005, SuperShuttle DFW converted to a franchise 
business model and required the drivers to sign agreements rechar-
acterizing their relationship as independent contractors.165 
On its way to affirming the Regional Director’s finding that 
these franchise drivers were independent contractors, the SuperShut-
tle Board took an interesting detour discussing the inapplicability of 
the “economic dependency” test implicitly disapproved by Con-
gress.166 The economic dependency test examined whether the pu-
tative independent contractor was dependent on the employer for its 
livelihood, favoring an employee relationship.167 The NLRB dis-
cussed how the Supreme Court of the United States, similar to Cal-
ifornia in Borello, adopted a public policy reasoning for adopting a 
 
 160 Id. at 3–4. 
 161 Id. at 14 (quoting SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 9 (Jan. 
25, 2019)). 
 162 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 163 See SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 1. 
 164 Id. at 3. 
 165 Id. The relationship also provided the drivers with the ability to hire their 
own relief drivers but the “franchisee” drivers were required to supply their own 
shuttles and pay franchise fees and flat weekly fees for the right to use the Su-
perShuttle brand and dispatch services. Id. Additionally, the drivers were free to 
work as much as they wanted and were entitled to keep the money earned for 
assignments they accepted. Id. 
 166 Id. at 9 (citing NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)). 
 167 See id. at 9 n.15. 
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broad definition of the word “employee” under the NLRA in United 
States v. Silk.168 The Silk Court recognized that in light of the pur-
pose of the NLRA, the primary consideration was not the control 
factor heavily relied upon in the common law test but rather whether 
reading in the putative employee under the NLRA would effectuate 
the purposes of that act.169 Even though at the time, the NLRB was 
in favor of the expansive reading of the term “employee” by the Silk 
Court, the SuperShuttle Board discussed Congress’ subsequent im-
plicit rejection of such a reading: 
In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, Congress 
reacted to this expansive alternative to the common-
law test by specifically excluding independent con-
tractors from coverage under the Act. In subsequent 
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress 
had effectively abrogated the holdings of Hearst and 
Silk to the extent they authorized policy-based alter-
natives to the common-law agency test of employee 
and independent-contractor status in the absence of 
express statutory language.170 
After dispensing with the “economic dependency” test, the Su-
perShuttle Board then applied the common-law factors to Su-
perShuttle drivers and specifically noted that in taxi-like disputes, 
the most significant factors against the backdrop of entrepreneurial 
opportunity are: (1) the extent of control by the employer and; (2) 
the payment scheme.171 
SuperShuttle exhibited little control over its franchisee drivers 
because the drivers had near autonomy as to their day-to-day sched-
ule and performance since they could decide whether or not to ac-
cept trips, when to work, and what routes to take within their desig-
nated areas.172 The SuperShuttle Board also noted that the franchisee 
drivers were subject to various regulations by the Dallas Fort Worth 
 
 168 Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)). 
 169 See Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 
131–32 (1943)) (recognizing the purpose of the NLRA was to eliminate labor 
disputes and even the playing field in context of bargaining power). 
 170 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at 9. 
 171 See id. at 12–13. 
 172 See id. at 12. 
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Airport, but this was not indicative of SuperShuttle’s control over 
the drivers.173 The requirements set on the drivers by SuperShuttle 
consisted of frequent vehicle inspections, set fares, and some mini-
mal training which the SuperShuttle Board found were “vastly out-
weighed by the general control that franchisees have over their 
working conditions.”174 
On SuperShuttle’s payment scheme to its drivers, the SuperShut-
tle Board discussed the inferential differences between a flat fee and 
commission-based fee: “When an employer does not share in a 
driver’s profits from fares, the employer lacks motivation to control 
or direct the manner and means of the driver’s work.”175 Because 
the franchisee drivers were only required to pay a flat fee, the Su-
perShuttle payment structure leaned towards an independent con-
tractor status.176 
The SuperShuttle Board went on to discuss the fact that the driv-
ers supplied their own vehicles, that SuperShuttle did not supervise 
the method in which the drivers performed their tasks, and finally, 
that the written contract made clear that the franchisee drivers were 
independent contractors.177 The Board concluded that the extent of 
control, the payment scheme, and the investment risk in self-sup-
plied vehicles by the drivers provided the “franchisees with signifi-
cant entrepreneurial opportunity and control over how much money 
they make each month.”178 
Applying the SuperShuttle analysis to the challenges launched 
against Uber by its drivers, the OGC placed significant weight on 
the extent of control over the drivers by Uber and Uber’s payment 
structure.179 The OGC found that Uber drivers had significant entre-
preneurial opportunity and were thus independent contractors be-
cause they could determine what rides to accept, could work for a 
competitor service, and were not bound to drive at all.180 The OGC 
further reasoned that Uber drivers actually had more control over 
their earning potential than the franchisee drivers in SuperShuttle 
 
 173 Id. at 13. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. at 13–14. 
 178 Id. at 14. 
 179 See NLRB Advice Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 180 Id. at 5. 
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since those drivers could not negotiate the standard fees set by Su-
perShuttle, while Uber drivers could log in or out of the platform 
when “surge” fares were active.181 
In contrast to the SuperShuttle franchisee drivers, however, Uber 
operates on a commission-based system which supports an em-
ployee inference because Uber would have a motivating factor to 
control the driver’s means and manner, decreasing entrepreneurial 
opportunity.182 The OGC noted that the payment structure was not 
dispositive but only indicative of the amount of control an employer 
might actually possess, and accordingly looked to the amount of 
control Uber exhibited based on this fee structure.183 The OGC 
noted that Uber did not exert control over the driver’s means itself 
but instead relied on customer feedback.184 It further reasoned that 
in all reality, the Uber fee structure actually increased entrepreneur-
ial opportunity because “this made it easier to take advantage of the 
unlimited freedom they had to work for competitors or pursue other 
ventures and drive for Uber only when it suited them.”185 
The OGC, like the SuperShuttle Board, summarily looked at the 
fact that drivers had to supply their own vehicles, were not super-
vised by Uber while they performed their tasks, and intended the 
relationship to be that of an independent contractor as evidenced by 
the written contract.186 These facts all supported independent con-
tractor status even though the OGC acknowledged that no special 
skill was necessary on behalf of the drivers and that the drivers were 
in fact an integral part of Uber’s regular business.187 Accordingly, 
the OGC concluded that UberX drivers were independent contrac-
tors under the NLRA and that UberBLACK drivers were not sub-
stantially distinct to be treated any differently.188 
 
 181 Id. at 9. “Surge” fares refers to increased fares for certain locations during 
high-demand times which drivers could take advantage of for additional profita-
bility. Id. at 7. 
 182 Id. at 10. 
 183 Id. at 11. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See id. at 11–12. 
 187 Id. at 13. 
 188 Id. at 14–15. In fact, UberBLACK drivers were clearly independent con-
tractors, inter alia, since they could hire other drivers and contracted with Uber 
as distinct business entities. Id. at 15. 
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1.  NLRB DISCUSSION 
The NLRB’s approach to the employment classification issue 
makes clear that the “remedial statutory purpose” engagement seen 
in California’s Borello, and subsequently the Dynamex precedent, 
has been rejected by Congress and the Supreme Court under the 
NLRA.189 Even though the NLRB’s approach is much closer to that 
of Florida as seen in Keith, at least in the emphasis placed on the 
common law factors in the Restatement §220,190 the NLRB applies 
these factors through a different lens. While Florida applies the com-
mon law factors as against the backdrop of party intent,191 the NLRB 
seems to place party intent low on the totem pole and keeps entre-
preneurial opportunity at the forethought of its analysis.192 
In reviewing the approaches taken by California, Florida, and 
NLRB at the federal level, one thing is clear: A multitude of juris-
dictions have essentially applied the same factors but have come to 
different conclusions. They have done so not solely based on the 
characterization of the facts involved, but also on the guiding prin-
ciples the particular jurisdiction applied against these common law 
factors. Accordingly, a party seeking to determine its relationship 
status would avail itself of more certainty by ascertaining the juris-
dictional guiding principles it finds itself up against rather than the 
factors articulated in the Restatement §220.193 
In fact, it is arguably this very jurisdictional guiding principle 
that has manifested itself into California’s AB 5. The “remedial stat-
utory purpose” principle discussed in Borello, Martinez, and Dy-
namex suggests as much. Based on this principle, employers are now 
faced with a presumption of employer-employee, with the burden of 
proving otherwise through the “ABC” test—yet another narrow var-
iation of the common law factors.194 As such, this Note has identi-
fied the “remedial statutory purpose” principle, the “party-intent” 
principle, and now the “entrepreneurial opportunity” principle as 
 
 189 The “statutory purpose” principle and the expansive read of the definition 
of “employee” is still alive and well in other federal social benefit frameworks. 
See infra Part IV. 
 190 See supra note 52. 
 191 See supra Part II.C. 
 192 See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 193 See supra note 52. 
 194 See id. 
978 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:945 
 
starting points for societal benefit employment classification. The 
“pragmatic effect” principle would be especially applicable to gig 
economy issues, which places at the forefront of the analysis the 
necessary independent contractor designation giving rise to the gig 
economy and the deleterious effect that an employee classification 
would have. 
2.  LIABILITY TREATMENT OF TNC DRIVERS AND ITS IMPACT 
ON SOCIAL BENEFITS 
Even though this Note is primarily focused on the social benefit 
aspect of employee classification, this is an appropriate time to raise 
the issue in the context of liability. Just like the SuperShuttle Board 
discussed congressional intent of the NLRA through subsequent leg-
islation,195 a reviewing court in the context of social benefit classi-
fication could look in the same direction for guidance. As of the time 
of this writing, every state, with the exception of Oregon, has some 
form of insurance legislation pertaining to TNCs and their drivers.196 
For practical purposes, this Note has classified these statutes into 
four distinct groups by their relative treatment of the TNC driver 
relationship. These four groups consist of: (1) explicit independent 
contractor designation, (2) implicit independent contractor designa-
tion, (3) implicit independent contractor designation unless con-
tracted otherwise, and (4) undefined relationship statutes. 
The first group consists of those states that have explicitly de-
fined the TNC driver relationship as that of an independent contrac-
tor. Although though there are some variations as to each state’s leg-
islative language, states that follow this approach explicitly desig-
nate drivers as independent contractors so long as the TNCs meet 
particular conditions.197 Some states explicitly designate the drivers 
 
 195 See Super SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 9 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
 196 See Transportation Network Company, PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASSOC., 
http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/60841263#/60841263/1 (last updated June 
21, 2018). 
 197 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.748 (9) (2020) (“A TNC driver is an independ-
ent contractor and not an employee of the TNC if all of the following conditions 
are met: (a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during which 
the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital network. (b) The TNC 
does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital networks from other TNCs. 
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in any other 
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as presumptively independent contractors, which can be rebutted 
based on the common-law agency test.198 
The second group consists of states that implicitly provide that 
TNC drivers are independent contractors or alternatively are not em-
ployees. For example, Arizona maintains that TNCs “may but [are] 
not deemed to own, operate or control a personal motor vehicle of a 
transportation network company driver.”199 Connecticut defines 
“driver” as “an individual who is not an employee of a transportation 
network company but who uses a transportation network company 
vehicle to provide prearranged rides.”200 
The third group consists of states that essentially condition the 
relationship on the terms of the written contract. States that follow 
this approach use language similar to Rhode Island: “A transporta-
tion network company shall not be deemed to control, direct, or 
manage the personal vehicles or transportation network company 
drivers that connect to its digital network, except where agreed to by 
written contract.”201 
The fourth and final group are those states that are silent on the 
relationship.202 This group consists of states that either define a 
“driver” simply to be “a driver certified by a transportation network 
company”203 or an individual who uses their own personal vehicle 
and the TNC digital platform to perform prearranged ridges.204 
As pointed out above, several states, either expressly or implic-
itly, maintain that drivers are independent contractors or at least not 
employees. A reviewing state court could look to these statutes as 
evidence of legislative intent when dealing with its own social ben-
efit statute, but its weight will likewise ultimately depend on the 
 
occupation or business. (d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the 
TNC driver is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.”). 
 198 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-280.8 (2019). 
 199 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-9551(3) (2020). 
 200 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13b-116(2) (2019). 
 201 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-14.2-1(8) (West 2021). 
 202 The outliers include Virginia and California. Virginia simply refers to TNC 
drivers as “partners.” See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-2099.48 (2020). California, as 
discussed above, will attempt to presumptively treat TNC drivers as employees 
under AB 5 starting January 1, 2020. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2750.3(a)(1) (West 
2020). 
 203 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 159A1/2, § 1 (West 2020). 
 204 See MINN. STAT. § 65B.472(1)(f) (2020). 
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guiding principle at play. The discussion above on agency jurispru-
dence on the state and federal level establishes that there are various 
guiding principles in existence. This Note continues to argue that 
one of these guiding principles should consider the “pragmatic ef-
fect” on the gig industry. With this in mind, this Note now turns to 
the consequences TNCs face if confronted with an employee classi-
fication for its drivers. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYEE DESIGNATION 
Thus far, this Note has examined some of the tensions at play 
within the legal debate over employee classification. What brings 
this debate into perspective, however, is the financial impact an em-
ployer faces when an employment relationship is established. 
Among other costs, employers are faced with statutory obligations 
based on an employer-employee relationship. Some of these statu-
torily imposed costs consist of obligations under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act,205 the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act,206 the Fair Labor Standards Act,207 the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act,208 and other state-level obligations like workers’ 
compensation209 or unemployment benefits.210 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was 
enacted by Congress with the goal of financially securing employee 
benefit plans and preventing retirees from losing such anticipated 
benefits.211 ERISA applies to any employee benefit plan established 
or maintained “by any employer engaged in commerce or in any in-
dustry or activity affecting commerce.”212 ERISA defines 
 
 205 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. 
 206 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128. 
 207 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 208 Id. §§ 2601–2619. 
 209 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440 (2020). 
 210 See Sonja Sharp, Uber Drivers Secure Unemployment Benefits, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:27 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-drivers-secure-
unemployment-benefits-1476405341. 
 211 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 
 212 Id. § 1003(a)(1). 
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“employee” as “any individual employed by the employer.”213 Even 
though ERISA is a complex statutory scheme, it provides some 
noteworthy employee protections. First, it sets out that an employee 
has a nonforfeitable right to their retirement benefit at retirement age 
or vests a nonforfeitable percentage of the retirement benefit which 
increases with years of service.214 ERISA does not seek to establish 
a uniform pension plan for employees, rather it seeks to ensure that 
whatever retirement plan is offered by the employer, the employee 
will have access to its benefit upon retirement.215 The way ERISA 
meets this end is by requiring employers to pay into a fund admin-
istered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.216 The mini-
mum payment amount is dependent on the particular plan estab-
lished by the employer and its funding requirement.217 Even though 
ERISA does not mandate a retirement plan, gaining employee clas-
sification would enable drivers to unionize under the NLRA and 
condition negotiations on such benefits.218 
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)219 estab-
lished a tax scheme that funds the Social Security Act (“SSA”).220 
Employees are obligated to pay a 6.2% tax on earned wages which 
funds the SSA and an additional 1.45% tax on earned wages, which 
funds Medicare under the SSA.221 Under FICA, employers are obli-
gated to match the employee’s contribution.222 FICA, in part, de-
fines an “employee” as “any individual who, under the usual com-
mon law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee 
 
 213 Id. § 1002(2)(B)(6); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 
318, 323 (1992) (holding that determination of “employee” under ERISA is ana-
lyzed under the common-law agency test). 
 214 See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a). 
 215 See U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., FACT SHEET: WHAT IS ERISA, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-cen-
ter/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 216 See 29 U.S.C. § 1302. 
 217 Id. § 1082(a)(1). 
 218 See generally id. §§ 151–169 (establishing rights of employees under the 
NLRA). 
 219 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3128. 
 220 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NO. 05-10297, WHAT IS FICA? (2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/thirdparty/materials/pdfs/educators/What-is-FICA-
Infographic-EN-05-10297.pdf. 
 221 See 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a)–(b). 
 222 See id. § 3111(a)–(b). 
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relationship, has the status of an employee.”223 Further, the Social 
Security Administration has promulgated rules that declare the com-
mon law rules “the basic test” for determining employment classifi-
cation.224 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) was enacted by 
Congress to establish a minimum standard of “living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”225 The FLSA 
includes minimum hourly wage requirements226 and sets a maxi-
mum workweek of forty hours per week unless the employee is paid 
at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate at which em-
ployed.227 Currently, the FLSA minimum wage requirement is $7.25 
per hour.228 The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual 
employed by an employer,” and does not distinguish between full-
time or part-time employment.229 Interestingly enough, the determi-
nation of employee or independent contractor under the FLSA has 
kept in tune with the same line of reasoning as Silk, discussed in Part 
II.D. of this Note.230 The Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Di-
vision—charged with administrating the FLSA—has continued to 
maintain that “[t]he employer-employee relationship under the 
FLSA is tested by ‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical 
 
 223 Id. § 3121(d)(2). 
 224 20 C.F.R. § 404.1007(a) (2019). The Social Security Administration con-
siders the following factors when determining employee status: (1) whether the 
person you work for can fire you; (2) whether that person provides tools or equip-
ment and a place to work; (3) whether you receive training or instructions from 
the person you work for; (4) whether you are required to do the work yourself; (5) 
whether you can hire, supervise, or pay assistants; (6) whether person you work 
for sets your hours of work; (7) whether person you work for pays any of your 
expenses; and (8) how often you are paid. Id. 
 225 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
 226 Id. § 206. 
 227 Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 228 Id. § 206(a)(1)(C). 
 229 Id. § 203(e)(1). 
 230 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947); see also Walling v. 
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (holding that the FLSA con-
tained its own definition of “employee” which encompassed a large swath of em-
ployment otherwise contemplated as independent contractor work). 
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concepts.’ It is not determined by the common law standards relat-
ing to master and servant.”231 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”)232 provides 
employees with the ability to take unpaid leaves of absences for cer-
tain periods of time with continued employee benefits.233 Under the 
FMLA, an employee who takes an absence protected under the stat-
ute does not lose any accrued employment benefits and is entitled to 
the same or equivalent position held upon return.234 Additionally, 
the employer must maintain the employee’s medical coverage under 
any “group health plan” while the employee is on protected leave 
under the FMLA.235 The FMLA, however, only applies if the em-
ployer employs fifty or more employees at a particular worksite.236 
The FMLA defines “employee” as “an employee who has been em-
ployed . . . for at least 12 months . . . and for at least 1,250 hours of 
service during the previous 12-month period.”237 Further, the FMLA 
states that “employee” has the same meaning as “employee” under 
the FLSA.238 Accordingly, courts apply the “economic realities” test 
in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists 
for FMLA purposes.239 
On the state level, TNCs can also be subjected to additional ob-
ligations, like workers’ compensation. Workers’ compensation pro-
vides employees with the ability to recover expenses incurred due 
to workplace injuries.240 In return, the employer is insulated from 
 
 231 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. FACT SHEET, supra note 48; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FINAL RULE: INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2021), https://www.dol.gov/agen-
cies/whd/flsa/2021-independent-contractor (reaffirming the “economic reality” 
test under the FLSA and emphasizing the factors of control and profit/loss oppor-
tunity as the “most probative.”). 
 232 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2619. 
 233 Id. § 2614(a)(1). 
 234 Id. § 2614(a)(2). 
 235 Id. § 2614(c)(1). 
 236 See id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). 
 237 Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 238 Id. § 2611(3). 
 239 See Coulibaly v. Tillerson, 273 F. Supp. 3d 16, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 240 See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2020). 
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tort claims by the employee due to the cause of injury.241 In Florida, 
the Workers’ Compensation Law applies to employers that employ 
four or more employees.242 Independent contractors who are not in 
the construction industry are not covered, and the statute sets out 
classification factors.243 The statute enables the employee to con-
tinue to receive their average weekly pay, subject to various fac-
tors.244 Additionally, the employer is required to pay the employee 
a percentage of their weekly wage based on the degree of disability 
sustained.245 In 2015, workers’ compensation was estimated to cost 
employers $1.32 per $100 of earned wages.246 
Another state obligation can be in the form of unemployment 
benefits. In fact, Uber has already been found liable for unemploy-
ment benefits in New York in some cases.247 In 2015, the New York 
State Department of Labor determined that an Uber driver was an 
employee for purposes of unemployment insurance, while finding 
other drivers were independent contractors during the same time 
frame.248 With these obligations in mind, this Note takes a glance at 
the Ford Motor Company, which is illustrative of the potential costs 
some of these requirements place on employers. 
A.  The Ford Motor Company and Statutory Obligation 
Discussion 
At the extreme end of the spectrum, the Ford Motor Company 
provides a glimpse of the costs of employee benefits. Ford employs 
over 55,000 U.S. hourly employees.249 These employees are 
 
 241 See id. Also, failure on behalf of the employer to comply with the statute 
bars the employer from raising the defense of third-party negligence, assumption 
of risk, or the employee’s comparative negligence during a civil suit. See id. 
§ 440.06. 
 242 Id. § 440.02 (17)(a)(2). 
 243 See id. § 440.02 (15)(d)(1)(a). 
 244 See id. § 440.14(1). 
 245 See id. § 440.15. 
 246 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 2017, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2017/workerscomp.html 
(last visited May 15, 2021). 
 247 See Sharp, supra note 210. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See KELLI FELKER & TED O’NEIL, UAW-FORD, 2019 UAW-FORD 
NEGOTIATIONS MEDIA FACT GUIDE 4, 
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represented through the United Automobile Workers (the “UAW”) 
Union.250 In anticipation of upcoming renegotiations with the UAW, 
Ford released a Media Fact Guide in 2019 that provides helpful in-
sight into employee cost.251 At the time, Ford expected that the 
healthcare cost alone for these employees would exceed $1 billion 
by 2020.252 Ford explained that these employees pay no healthcare 
premiums or deductibles and that across sectors, only 7% of U.S. 
employees have the benefit of paying no deductible.253 
Ford reported its Hourly Labor Costs (“HLC”)—the cost of la-
bor including pay, cost of contractual benefits, and statutory pay-
ments like Social Security and workers’ compensation—at $54 per 
hour.254 Ford calculated this average over four employee groups, 
which included “Skilled Trades,” “Legacy,” “In-Progression,” and 
“Temporary” employees.255 Ford reported that in 2018, Legacy em-
ployees made between $28 and $30 per hour,256 while In-Progres-
sion employees made between $17 and $30 per hour,257 and Tem-
porary employees made between $15.78 and $19.28 per hour.258 
Ford did not provide pay information for its Skilled Trades employ-
ees in the Media Fact Guide, but a 2015 Skilled Trades Agreement 
between Ford and the UAW revealed these employees are paid be-
tween $29.26 and $34.02 per hour.259 For purposes of this Note, the 




 250 Id. 
 251 See id. at 3–4. 
 252 See id. at 16. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 13. This number includes a net credit for Ford based on pension port-
folio returns. Id. Ford reports that without this net credit, their HLC is $61 per 
hour. Id. 
 255 Id. at 7. 
 256 Id. at 9. 
 257 Id. at 10. This range reflects the difference between starting and maximum 
wage. Id. 
 258 Id. at 11. Ford did not provide pay information for its Skilled Trade em-
ployees, which makes up approximately 17% of its UAW workforce. Id. at 8. 
 259 See Skilled Trades Agreements and Letters of Understanding between 
UAW and the Ford Motor Company 22 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://uaw.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/11/UAW-Ford-Skilled-Trades-digipubZ.pdf. 
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$28.32 per hour.260 Subtracting the average pay to each employee 
from Ford’s self-reported HLC of $54 yielded an additional em-
ployee benefit payment of $25.68 per hour.261 This represents a 47% 
cost increase on Ford’s behalf based on employee status.262 Ford’s 
benefit-cost encompasses more than just statutory obligations be-
cause of other negotiated terms between itself and the UAW.263 The 
fact that these employees can unionize under the UAW, however, is 
preceded by an employee designation under the NLRA, as discussed 
above.264 
In September 2019, the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (the “BLS”) provided a news release on the topic of em-
ployer compensation cost.265 The BLS reported that employee ben-
efits account for approximately 31% of the employer’s cost.266 Em-
ployee compensation averaged $36.61 per hour, wherein $25.12 of 
that was direct pay.267 Employers paid an additional $11.48 per hour 
for employee benefits.268 The $11.48 benefit pay consisted of $2.64 
for paid leave, $1.03 for supplemental pay (e.g., overtime and shift 
pay), $3.19 for insurance benefits (where health insurance made up 
a majority of the cost at $3.04), $1.94 for retirement and savings 
plans, and $2.68 for statutory obligations.269 With these figures in 
mind, what does it all mean for TNCs? 
 
 260 This calculation also assumes that each employee group comprises a quar-
ter of Ford’s workforce, which is not the case. See FELKER & O’NEIL, supra note 
249, at 8. This Note is only meant to provide a general overview and not an exact 
employer-cost based on benefit obligations. 
 261 This calculation was performed by this Note’s author. 
 262 This calculation was performed by this Note’s author. 
 263 See FELKER & O’NEIL, supra note 249, at 7–22 (describing employee ben-
efits, many of which have been negotiated with the UAW). 
 264 See supra Parts II.C & II.D.1. 
 265 News Release, Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., No. USDL-19-1649, 
Employer Cost for Employee Compensation – June 2019 1 (Sept. 17, 2019) [here-
inafter Dep’t of Lab. News Release], https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ar-
chives/ecec_09172019.pdf. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
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B.  Statutory Obligations and TNC Discussion 
At the end of 2018, Uber and Lyft had a combined five million 
drivers on their platforms.270 This is significantly more than the 
55,000 Ford employees discussed above, where employee benefits 
represent approximately 47% of Ford’s cost.271 Even though Ford is 
an extreme example of employee-benefit cost, the Department of 
Labor reported an average cost increase of 31%.272 Rough estimates 
based on the self-reported earnings of Uber and Lyft drivers previ-
ously discussed273 would place Uber’s HLC at $6.11274 and Lyft’s 
HLC at $5.52.275 In total, this would represent an approximate in-
crease of $23 million in HLC for Uber276 and $6 million for Lyft.277 
Even if it is assumed that 100% of drivers work twenty hours per 
week,278 this would represent a yearly cost of $6 billion for Lyft and 
$23 billion for Uber.279 The increased operating costs are fatal to 
Uber and Lyft’s business models.280 Uber reported 2018 revenue in 
 
 270 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5; Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2. 
 271 See supra notes 249 and 262 and accompanying text. 
 272 See Dep’t of Lab News Release, supra note 265, at 1. 
 273 See supra Part I. 
 274 This figure was calculated at the pre-expense average pay rate of $19.73 at 
31% yielding a $6.11 HLC. It is important to note that the Ford calculations were 
based on actual wages Ford paid its employees. Because Uber and Lyft do not in 
the same sense pay its drivers, but rather take a commission of the fare, the calcu-
lated HLC here represents the best attempt on the available data. 
 275 This figure was calculated at the pre-expense average pay rate of $17.81 at 
31% yielding a $5.52 Hourly Labor Cost. 
 276 This figure was calculated by multiplying the number of drivers Uber re-
ported on its platform (3.9 million), Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 5, by the 
$6.11 increase cost for employee benefits. See supra note 274 and accompanying 
text. 
 277 This figure was calculated by multiplying the number of drivers Lyft re-
ported on its platform (1.1 million), Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 2, by the $5.52 
increase cost for employee benefits. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 278 Lyft, for example, reports that over 90% of its drivers work less than twenty 
hours per week. LYFT, 2020 Economic Impact Report, supra note 28. 
 279 This increased operating cost assumes that all TNC drivers would be clas-
sified as employees. 
 280 These calculations are based on the assumption that five million drivers are 
actively operating on Uber and Lyft’s platform at the rate of 20 hours per week 
and that the employee-benefit cost would represent approximately 31% of driver 
compensation, even though drivers are currently paid on commission and is the 
only available data. 
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the amount of $11 billion with an operating cost of $14 billion.281 
Lyft reported a $2.2 billion 2018 revenue with a $3.1 billion operat-
ing cost.282 
The increased operating cost based on employee classification is 
enough for TNCs to seek alternative methods in which to become 
more profitable by eliminating these costs. One way283 TNCs are 
currently exploring reducing operating costs in the long term is 
through heavily investing in autonomous driving research and de-
velopment. If successful, TNCs will not have to worry about em-
ployee classifications because it will simply not have a need for driv-
ers.284 Arguably, AB 5 and like legislation effectively incentivizes 
TNCs to double-down on autonomous research and development 
which will eliminate the estimated five million drivers that depend 
on the gig economy for supplemental income. The final part of this 
Note discusses the current state of autonomous driving research and 
development by TNCs. 
IV.  PROACTIVE INDUSTRY MEASURES AGAINST EMPLOYEE 
DESIGNATION AND COVID-19’S IMPACT 
In 2014, Uber’s then CEO, Travis Kalanick, stated “[t]he reason 
Uber could be expensive is because you’re not just paying for the 
car—you’re paying for the other dude in the car. When there’s no 
other dude in the car, the cost of taking an Uber anywhere becomes 
cheaper than owning a vehicle.”285 In 2015, Uber announced a 
 
 281 See Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at F-4 app. (Consolidated Financial 
Statements). 
 282 See Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at F-4 app. (Consolidated Financial State-
ments). 
 283 This Note does not discuss any reactive measures that TNCs are likely to 
take which could include: limiting work hours to less than forty hours per week 
to avoid overtime pay, limiting work hours to avoid the accumulation of required 
time for FMLA leave, and other work limitations to avoid triggering benefits un-
der various state laws. 
 284 Of course, there is the possibility that legislative action could also curtail 
the implementation of autonomous driving, a separate and distinct discussion not 
at the center of this Note. 
 285 Mark Harris, Uber Could be First to Test Completely Driverless Cars in 
Public, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 14, 2015), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-
think/transportation/self-driving/uber-could-be-first-to-test-completely-driver-
less-cars-in-public. 
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partnership with Carnegie Mellon University with the goal of devel-
oping autonomous driving capability.286 Since then, Uber has been 
actively testing and developing autonomous capability except for a 
nine-month halt after one of its autonomous vehicles struck and trag-
ically killed Elaine Herzberg in Tempe, Arizona, on March 18, 
2018.287 Less than a month after the incident, the current CEO of 
Uber, Dan Khosrowshahi was interviewed and stated “we’re abso-
lutely committed to self-driving cars” and that these vehicles “will 
be safer than humans.”288 
In 2018 alone, Uber invested $457 million in autonomous driv-
ing research and development and has since raised $1 billion 
through private investors to continue funding the project.289 Lyft has 
also ventured into the autonomous driving field, assigning 400 en-
gineers to develop autonomous driving packages that it can install 
in any vehicle.290 Lyft is also working on integrating other autono-
mous vehicle companies into its on-demand ride-hailing plat-
form.291 
 
 286 Uber and CMU Announce Strategic Partnership and Advanced Technolo-
gies Center, UBER BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.uber.com/blog/uber-and-
cmu-announce-strategic-partnership-and-advanced-technologies-center/. 
 287 See Carolyn Said, Uber Puts the Brakes on Testing Robot Cars in Califor-
nia after Arizona Fatality, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.sfchroni-
cle.com/business/article/Uber-pulls-out-of-all-self-driving-car-testing-in-
12785490.php; Sean O’Kane, Uber Debuts a New Self-Driving Car With More 
Fail-Safes, VERGE (June 12, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/
6/12/18662626/uber-volvo-self-driving-car-safety-autonomous-factory-level; 
Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedes-
trian in Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2018/03/20/us/self-driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html. 
 288 NBC News, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi: ‘We’re Absolutely Commit-
ted to Self-Driving Cars’, TODAY (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.to-
day.com/video/uber-ceo-dara-khosrowshahi-we-re-absolutely-committed-to-
self-driving-cars-1209073731757. 
 289 Alison Griswold, Uber Raised $1 Billion for Self-Driving Cars Because It 
Desperately Needs the Money, QUARTZ (Apr. 19, 2019), https://qz.com/
1599134/uber-secures-much-needed-1-billion-investment-for-self-driving-cars-
unit/. 
 290 Lora Kolodny et al., Take a Peek Inside Lyft’s Lab Where 400 Engineers 
are Working on Self-Driving Cars, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/lyft-is-developing-self-driving-cars-at-its-level-5-
lab-in-palo-alto.html. 
 291 See id. 
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Even though Uber foresees autonomous vehicle integration as a 
long-term goal, the only obstacle at the moment is likely the techno-
logical restraint.292 With legislation like AB 5 and other similar pol-
icy objectives, TNCs are likely incentivized to raise and increase 
funding for research and development into autonomous vehicles. 
AB 5 does not only threaten TNCs based on the prohibitive cost 
that it would impose, but it also threatens TNCs’ ability to retain 
their driver base. This is because one-third of drivers cite flexibility 
as the main reason that they drive for TNCs in the first place.293 Dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic, 80,000 drivers were solicited for a 
poll and 734 responses were received.294 Over 70% of drivers de-
sired to maintain an independent contractor status.295 An employee 
classification could simply reduce the number of drivers willing to 
operate under a set schedule that TNCs would have to develop or 
implement in some way. In fact, Uber discusses the importance of 
driver retention as a risk factor in its S-1 filing: 
Our success in a given geographic market signifi-
cantly depends on our ability to maintain or increase 
our network scale and liquidity in that geographic 
market by attracting Drivers, consumers, restaurants, 
shippers, and carriers to our platform. If Drivers 
choose not to offer their services through our plat-
form, or elect to offer them through a competitor’s 
platform, we may lack a sufficient supply of Drivers 
to attract consumers and restaurants to our platform. 
We have experienced and expect to continue to ex-
perience Driver supply constraints in most geo-
graphic markets in which we operate.296 
Alternatively, employee classification could lead TNCs to re-
duce the number of drivers on their respective platforms in jurisdic-
tions that recognize drivers as such or eliminate service altogether. 
 
 292 Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 10. 
 293 CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 4. 
 294 See Campbell, supra note 46. 
 295 Id. This reflected a 10% decrease from a pre-COVID-19 poll which 
showed 81% were in favor of retaining an independent contractor status. Id. 
 296 Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 1, at 29; Lyft discusses the same in its S-1 
filing. See Lyft, Inc., supra note 15, at 23. 
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As a matter of fact, Uber and Lyft were on the verge of significantly 
reducing their California operations as a result of a state court ruling 
ordering them to comply with AB 5.297 This would further disserve 
local communities that are already economically disadvantaged and 
depend on these services for transportation.298 In fact, commentators 
have discussed the positive impact that ride-hailing services have 
had in economically depressed communities that have little to no 
access to alternative transportation.299 Although the majority of this 
Note was written pre-COVID-19, we have seen many of the proac-
tive measures discussed above deployed in response to market and 
legislative forces during the pandemic. 
The seemingly endless COVID-19 pandemic continues to dom-
inate the news daily. When the story is not directly centered on the 
latest infection numbers or tragic death count, headlines on the eco-
nomic impact follow.300 The pandemic has placed center stage the 
TNC driver classification debate for obvious reasons.301 On one 
hand, states are incentivized to ensure their constituents have access 
to paid sick leave and healthcare.302 This, they hope, would allow 
drivers not to have to choose between earning pay and their 
health.303 On the other hand, lockstep with several other businesses, 
Uber and Lyft have dramatically cut their employee workforce.304 
 
 297 See Rana, Lyft, Uber Get More Time, supra note 109. 
 298 See Kaitlyn Laurie, Capping Uber in New York City: Ramifications for 
Rideshares, the Road, and Outer-Borough Residents, FORDHAM URB. L.J., 942, 
959–62 (2019). 
 299 See id. 
 300 See, e.g., Julia Horowitz, New Coronavirus Variants are Threatening the 
World’s Economic Recovery, CNN (Feb. 11, 2021, 8:47 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/11/investing/premarket-stocks-trading/in-
dex.html. 
 301 See Preetika Rana, Uber Cuts 3,000 More Jobs, Shuts 45 Offices in Coro-
navirus Crunch, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2020) [hereinafter Rana, Uber Cuts], 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-cuts-3-000-more-jobs-shuts-45-offices-in-
coronavirus-crunch-11589814608. 
 302 See Andrew J. Hawkins, Massachusetts Sues Uber and Lyft over Driver 
Classification, VERGE (Jul. 14, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/7/14/21324199/uber-lyft-driver-misclassification-massachusetts-lawsuit. 
 303 See id. 
 304 See Rana, Uber Cuts, supra note 301. 
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The independent contractor designation has spared drivers from the 
same fate.305 
By mid-May 2020, Uber decided to cut approximately 6,700 
jobs and close several offices.306 This accounted for almost a quarter 
of Uber’s employee workforce.307 Lyft has also scaled back its 
workforce by approximately 17%.308 In April 2019, Uber saw an 
80% decrease on its ridesharing platform due to the pandemic.309 
The cutbacks, therefore, come as no surprise. Uber also recently an-
nounced it would be scaling back its autonomous vehicle program 
as a cost-saving initiative.310 Lyft, however, restarted its program in 
late June 2020.311 
Additionally, in May, California sued Uber and Lyft under the 
implementation of AB 5, seeking millions in civil penalties and un-
paid wages.312 Uber responded by citing the four million California 
workers currently unemployed and argued such policy would make 
employment opportunities harder to come across.313 Uber and Lyft 
have maintained that an employee classification would result in de-
creased ridesharing operations in such areas.314 
Massachusetts launched its own lawsuit against Uber and Lyft 
in July 2020, similarly arguing that TNCs have been misclassifying 
their drivers.315 Instead of passing legislation like California, Mas-
sachusetts appears to be taking the debate to the courts under the 
common-law agency test, alluding to the control factor discussed 
 
 305 See generally id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Sebastian Herrera & Tim Higgins, California Sues Uber, Lyft Saying They 
Misclassified Drivers as Independent Contractors, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-to-sue-uber-lyft-saying-they-misclassi-
fied-drivers-as-independent-contractors-11588700626. 
 309 See Rana, Uber Cuts, supra note 301. 
 310 Id. 
 311 See Kristen Korosec, Lyft’s Self-Driving Test Vehicles Are Back on Public 
Roads in California, TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/
2020/06/30/lyfts-self-driving-test-vehicles-are-back-on-public-roads-in-califor-
nia/. 
 312 Herrera & Higgins, supra note 308. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Hawkins, supra note 302. 
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above.316 Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey stated 
“Uber and Lyft set the rates. They alone set the rules. Drivers are 
employees.”317 Like its response to California, Uber cited the threat 
the lawsuit posed to the 50,000 Massachusettsans on its platform 
who could find themselves out of supplemental income.318 
In their response to California and Massachusetts, Uber and Lyft 
point to the “pragmatic effect” such designation would have on its 
platform and drivers.319 Although investment in autonomous re-
search may have been scaled back, Lyft’s renewed research demon-
strates that autonomous capability is a key goal of TNCs.320 Even 
though Proposition 22 has now exempted Uber and Lyft from 
AB 5’s grasp, TNCs have significant upcoming legal battles to face. 
On May 2, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the 
Protecting the Right to Organize Act (the “PRO Act”).321 Section 
4(a)(2) of the PRO Act would amend the NLRA by adopting the 
statutory presumption of employer-employee along with the “ABC” 
test and would abrogate the NLRB’s SuperShuttle classification 
test.322 Like AB 5, the prospects of federal oversight on this front 
more than sufficiently incentivizes TNCs to avoid the issue alto-
gether and automate a majority of their workforce. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has reviewed available data on TNC driver de-
mographics and, though limited, has indicated that a majority of 
drivers engage these ride-hailing platforms as part of the gig econ-
omy, seeking supplementary rather than primary sources of income. 
Further, the discussion on various legal approaches taken by courts 
 
 316 See id.; supra Part II. 






 318 See Hawkins, supra note 302. 
 319 See id.; Herrera & Higgins, supra note 308. 
 320 See Korosec, supra note 311. 
 321 Protecting the Right to Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 322 See id. § 4(a)(2) (2019). 
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and administrations on employee classification has revealed wide 
inconsistencies. Even though all of these approaches apply the same 
or variations of the common-law agency test, they end up with var-
ying classifications on similar facts. This discrepancy is best at-
tributable to the lens in which each authority is applying the com-
mon-law agency test. This Note has discussed in depth three of these 
lenses: (1) the “remedial statutory purpose” lens seen in California 
through Borello, Dynamex, and AB 5; (2) the “party-intent” lens 
seen in Florida through Keith and Kendall; and (3) the “entrepre-
neurial opportunity” lens applied by the NLRB but not exclusive in 
all federal matters. 
While providing a broad look at statutory obligations at the fed-
eral level to include ERISA, FICA, FMLA, FLSA, and state-level 
obligations like workers’ compensation and unemployment benefit, 
this Note took a cursory look at costs associated with such obliga-
tions, concluding an approximate 31% HLC increase upon em-
ployee classification. Applying this cost to the TNC business model, 
the prohibitive nature of such classification was realized. Even 
though employee classification may not be the direct motivating fac-
tor in which TNCs have invested heavily in autonomous vehicle de-
velopment, policies like AB 5 and the PRO Act surely incentivize 
TNCs to continue to research and develop this technology as quickly 
as possible. TNCs’ commitment to autonomous research has (seem-
ingly) survived the COVID-19 pandemic as TNCs continue to cut 
costs. 
With five million drivers on TNC platforms, policies like AB 5 
and the PRO Act could end up hurting these gig economy drivers in 
the long run, foreclosing the opportunity to generate supplemental 
income. COVID-19 has spurned additional attacks on TNCs in Mas-
sachusetts, and additional states may follow suit. Because of this 
very real threat, legislators and reviewing authorities should also 
take a hard look at the employee classification issue through the lens 
of the “pragmatic effect” that such policy consequences will have 
on the gig economy. The “pragmatic effect” principle should look 
at how gig economy industries necessarily depend on the independ-
ent contractor status at inception and also how an employee classi-
fication could result in the industry’s destruction. This is especially 
true at a time where economic recovery in the post-COVID market 
will depend on the ability of workers generating supplemental 
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income as many traditional employers reevaluate and adjust their 
market strategy. 
